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Perceptions of institutional complexity and lobbyists’ decisions to join 
lobbying coalitions – evidence from the European Union context 
Abstract 
We use data from in-depth interviews with business lobbyists in Brussels to investigate why 
they choose to join lobbying coalitions. We find that lobbyists face two competing 
institutional incentives. First, they are confronted with incentives to ally with other European 
organisations, develop multilateral policy messages, and communicate messages to the 
Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they face inducements to join narrower 
coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, and direct those messages at the Council. 
Lobbyists’ receptivity to these incentives – and thus their choices of lobbying coalitions – 
differs with their age, educational background, and with the type and ownership structure of 
the organisations they represent. Combined, our findings contribute to the limited, mainly 
American literature on interest coalitions by demonstrating that lobbyists operate in complex 
institutional environments, and that their interpretations of and reactions to institutional 
complexity are shaped by individual- and organisational-level factors.  
Key words: Lobbying coalitions; European Union; Institutional complexity 
1. Introduction 
Lobbying coalitions are sets of actors who coordinate efforts to petition policy officials and 
advance common advocacy agendas (eg, Baumgartner et al., 2009). They can take several 
forms, differing with respect to their degree of internal formalisation, the durability of 
relationships amongst members, and the independence that members retain within the 
coalition (eg, Pijnenburg, 1998). Lobbying coalitions can thus be placed on a continuum – 
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ranging from informal, short-term networks that address specific policy issues, to more 
formal, long-term alliances that tackle a broad spectrum of questions (eg, Mahoney, 2007).  
Lobbying coalitions are common – even ubiquitous – in Washington D.C. politics (eg, 
Nelson and Webb Yackee, 2012). They have also been identified as an increasingly frequent 
form of collective political action at the European Union (EU) level (eg, Greenwood and 
Aspinwall 1998). There has emerged in the United States a robust research tradition in 
coalition formation. This primarily American literature has addressed questions related to the 
behaviour of lobbyists within coalitions (eg, Hula, 1995; Hojnacki, 1998; Heaney, 2004) and 
the influence of coalitions over policy outcomes (eg, Nelson and Webb Yackee, 2012; Klüver, 
2013). In this paper, we focus attention specifically on understanding lobbyists’ decisions to 
join coalitions.  
Prior studies highlight numerous factors that explain when and why lobbyists join 
coalitions. According to some scholars (eg. Berry, 1989; Hula, 1999; Baumgartner et al, 
2009), lobbyists ally in coalitions to obtain access to scare skills, resources and policy-
relevant information. Others (eg, Loomis, 1986) suggest that lobbyists work in coalitions to 
signal to policymakers where the lion’s share of support lies for a given policy proposal. 
Conversely, lobbyists may avoid coalitions if they consider membership involves high 
resource commitments and lost time due to coordination efforts (eg, Gray and Lowery, 1998). 
Similarly, they may see no reason for joining coalitions if they perceive only weak opposition 
to their interests (eg, Hojnacki, 1997; Whitford, 2003).  
We welcome the scholarly interest in lobbying coalitions. However, in common with 
Bunea and Baumgartner (2014), we are concerned that there remains only modest interest in 
EU lobbying coalitions. As per other scholars (e.g. Woll, 2006; Coen, 2007), we also wonder 
whether existing studies into EU lobbying potentially take their theoretical cues too frequently 
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from models and concepts developed primarily by North American scholars to explain 
interest-group politics in the North American context. Rather than seeking to apply these 
existing theoretical models in a broad-brush and unquestioning manner to the EU context, we 
consider it more judicious to conduct context-sensitive research with the aim of developing 
theories that more explicitly reflect the specificities of the EU public policy process.  
In our view, institutional theory provides a useful analytical lens for conducting such 
research. To date, few scholars have explicitly recognised the need to consider how 
institutional structures and characteristics of political systems potentially determine whether 
lobbyists band together in alliances. For example, Gray and Lowery (1998) argue that 
lobbyists will be more inclined to ally in coalitions if policy issues are discussed broadly by a 
large number of committees or legislators across a political system. Coen (2004) finds that the 
changing institutional arrangements of the EU have over time encouraged lobbyists to join 
forces and alter their policy positions to gain entrance to restricted policymaking fora. For her 
part, Mahoney (2007) asserts that the democratic accountability of policy officials in a given 
political system is a key consideration explaining decisions to join coalitions.  
Our paper builds on these emerging institutions-based accounts of coalition activity by 
embracing the concept of institutional complexity. This relates to situations where 
organisations and individuals in a given field are confronted with “a multiplexity of different 
pressures from a plurality of institutional logics” (Greenwood et al., 2011: 357). Institutional 
logics, for their part, refer to the overarching sets of principles that prescribe appropriate 
behaviour (eg, Thornton, 2004). Individuals may potentially interpret the competing 
institutional logics at play in complex institutional environments in different ways, depending 
for example on the the structure, ownership, and governance of organisations they work for 
(eg, Greenwood et al, 2011), or their own previous professional or life experiences (eg, 
Tracey et al, 2010). Resulting variations in interpretations of institutional logics may in turn 
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lead to heterogeneous responses in terms of strategic actions (e.g. Oliver, 1991; Pache and 
Santos, 2010). 
Inspired by this recent theorising on institutional complexity, our own research interest 
lies in uncovering the different institutional logics that govern the work of lobbyists in 
Brussels, analysing how lobbyists experience those logics, and ultimately understanding how 
they respond strategically to institutional complexity. Our research specifically aims to 
explore the extent to which lobbyists’ are confronted with competing institutional incentives 
within the policymaking settings in which they operate, and investigate whether those 
incentives have a bearing on the types of lobbying coalitions they choose to join. We also 
seek to elucidate organisational- and individual-level factors that possibly influence lobbyists’ 
interpretations of institutional logics, and thus explain their decisions to join lobbying 
coalitions.  
Empirically, we investigate these questions through an explorative study of 
information-rich interviews with 26 lobbyists whose backgrounds and experiences vary in 
accordance with the type of organisation they work for, the industry sector in which they 
operate, their nationality, their educational profiles, their genders and their ages. Clearly, our 
focus is trained explicitly on the decision-making processes of individual lobbyists. This, in 
our view, is significant as the bulk of prior studies into EU lobbying tends to take individual 
firms (eg, Barron and Hulten, 2014), national-level business associations (eg, Wilts and 
Quitkatt, 2004) and European associations (eg, Greenwood, 2002) as their primary unit of 
analysis. By focusing on individual lobbyists, our research conversely seeks to unpack and 
examine EU lobbying at a deeper, more complex, human level. 
In making these contributions, we structure our paper as follows. We begin by 
establishing the theoretical framework that broadly guided our research. Next, we describe the 
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programme of empirical research underpinning our study. We then report and discuss our key 
findings, highlighting how they provide new insights for research into lobbying coalitions in 
general, and lobbying coalitions in the EU in particular. We round off our paper by addressing 
the limitations of our study and indicating future avenues of enquiry.  
2. Research framework  
2.1 Institutions, institutional complexity and decisions to join interest coalitions 
Institutions are dynamic, sense-making frameworks that guide organisational or individual 
behaviour in a given society (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995). They can be formal (such 
as government-instigated rules, regulations and laws reflecting societal choices that give 
structure to relations amongst individuals) or informal (including norms, values, and attitudes 
that form subjective perceptions of members of a society) (North, 1990). Institutional theory 
posits that, in a given field, individuals are incentivised to adopt broadly accepted behaviours 
– a process of isomorphism which secures access to resources and generates support from 
critical stakeholders (eg, DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Institutional theory has a strong tradition in lobbying research. Authors (eg, 
Blumentritt, 2003; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman and Keim, 1995) demonstrate that the 
political behaviours of organisations are shaped by formal and informal rules imposed by the 
national systems of governments and regulation in which they operate. For Lawton et al 
(2013), institutional theory is useful for explaining how different political, social and 
economic arrangements impact upon relations between lobbyists and governments, and helps 
us understand how lobbyists adapt (or not) to evolutions in political systems. Few scholars, 
however, have explicitly investigated whether and how institution structures encourage 
lobbyists to join coalitions.  
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Exceptions include Gray and Lowery (1998) who suggest that lobbyists are more 
inclined to join forces as coalitions in political systems where issues are discussed broadly 
across a large number of committees and by a large number of legislators across a political 
system. Others (eg, Bouwen, 2002; Coen, 1997; Eising, 2007; Mazey and Richardson, 2006; 
Woll, 2006) note the emergence in Brussels of a policymaking framework characterized by 
elite pluralism. Coen (1997) defines this as a system of interest representation where access is 
restricted to a few policy players and for whom membership is competitive and strategically 
advisable. Studies into elite pluralism implicitly suggest that the Commission provides 
lobbyists with incentives to join European federations to obtain access to EU policy forums 
(Broscheid and Coen, 2003; Coen, 1997; Taminiau and Wilts, 2006). For her part, Mahoney 
(2007) finds that Brussels-based lobbyists are less incentivised than their Washington D.C.-
based counterparts to join coalitions because officials within the European Commission, as 
unelected policymakers, are less receptive than the more electorally accountable policymakers 
in the U.S. Congress or Senate to messages from coalitions about widespread public support 
for their policy proposals.  
We welcome these emerging studies addressing institutional structures and their 
impact upon decisions to join lobbying coalitions. However, we nonetheless wonder whether 
they provide a relatively thin account of institutions and their effect on lobbyists’ coalition 
activities. Beyond the narrow field of lobbying research, scholars increasingly embrace the 
concept of ‘institutional complexity’ (Greenwood et al, 2011: 357) and investigate how 
organisations and individuals face numerous pressures from a plurality of institutional logics, 
or overarching sets of principles that prescribe appropriate behaviour (Thornton, 2004). 
Notions of institutional complexity and institutional logics have long been implicit within 
institutional theory.  
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For example, Meyer and Rowan (1977) noted how organisations encounter 
incompatible socio-cultural and commercial expectations in their business environments. This 
view is shared by Scott (1991) who stated that organisations face competing institutional 
incentives in the contexts where they operate. Elsbach and Sutton (1992) claimed that 
organisations are confronted with conflicting expectations stemming from different 
institutional actors who inhabit their external environments. D’Aunno et al (1991) suggested 
that organisations have difficulties operating in fragmented institutional environments where 
groups and organisations make incompatible demands on them. More recently, Thornton et al 
(2012) demonstrated how different institutional logics related to markets, corporations, 
professions, states, families, religions and communities can make competing demands on 
organisations and individuals.  
In our view, institutional complexity is a highly – and increasingly – relevant 
phenomenon for EU lobbyists. As revealed by Bunea and Baumgartner (2014) in their recent 
review of interest-group politics in the EU, scholars focus their attention narrowly on efforts 
undertaken to lobby the Commission. However, the EU constitutes a series of multi-level, 
decision-taking venues (e.g. Bouwen, 2002). As explained by Nugent (2010), the Commission 
represents but one of the three major institutions of the EU. In a process known as co-
decision, the European Council and the European Parliament jointl  scrutinise the 
Commission’s legislative proposals, the Council through a national lens, and the Parliament 
through an evaluation of their impact on both the Internal Market and the domestic markets of 
the Member States.  
Importantly, the dynamism of the EU’s institutional configurations adds to their 
complexity. Indeed, successive treaty changes have altered the balance of power across the 
EU institutions. For example, under the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009, the Council 
received additional powers with respect to the setting of the strategic objectives of the EU and 
Page 7 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
the handling of crises. The Treaty of Lisbon also increased the legislative power of the 
European Parliament, extending its co-decision-making to almost all policy areas. Following 
the Eurozone crisis, the institutional complexity of the EU intensified as the more 
intergovernmental European Council achieved a more central policymaking role (e.g. Puetter, 
2012). In our view, studies of EU lobbying would do well to consider more explicitly this 
dynamic, changing nature of the interplay between EU institutions.  
2.3. Variations in lobbyists’ responses to institutional complexity and institutional logics 
Another concern we raise against institutions-based lobbying research relates to the idea of 
agency. There is an underlying assumption, especially in the elite-pluralism tradition, that 
institutional pressures stemming from the Commission will ultimately encourage lobbyists to 
adopt homogeneous interest-representation practices Brussels. We wonder whether this 
research places too great an emphasis on how lobbyists comply with dominant isomorphic 
pressures. This focus, in our view, limits scholarly attention to how individuals respond 
passively and uncritically to mimetic forces. In doing so, it overlooks the extent to which 
strategic decision-makers within organisations – including lobbyists – can be much more 
questioning and purposeful actors who can react differently to institutional incentives.  
Our own concerns are shared by business and management scholars who have 
explicitly engaged with understanding the diverse strategies that individual managers adopt 
when faced with multiple institutional logics (eg, Oliver, 1991; Pache and Santos, 2010; 
Kraatz and Block, 2008). A common theme running through these works is that managers do 
not necessarily perceive and respond to institutional incentives in the same way. Instead, their 
perceptions of and responses to institutional pressures and incentives can be shaped by 
numerous factors.  
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One such factor might be the existence of actors located beyond organisations (such as 
professional or funding bodies). These can exert compliance pressures on managers through 
resource-dependence relationships (e.g. DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Organisations are likely to comply with the demands of these external 
stakeholders when they depend on them for key resources, including funds, staff, or licenses 
to operate. Managerial perceptions of and responses to institutional complexity might also be 
influenced by organisational attributes. For instance, Greenwood et al (2011) propose that the 
structure, ownership, and governance of organisations frame how managers experience and 
respond strategically to the multiplexity of different pressures exerted upon them from 
competing institutional logics. Other scholars focus on the commitment of individuals within 
organisations to certain institutional logics, suggesting that such commitments have an 
important role to play in terms of influencing strategies mobilised by organisations as they 
face institutional incentives and pressures (e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Mars & Lounsbury, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Tracey, Phillips & Jarvis 2010). In line with this more agency-
based research, managers possess filters through which institutional logics pass. The existence 
of these filters can help explain how and why organisations might respond differently to 
competing institutional incentives.  
2.4. Exploratory research framework 
Inspired by research into institutional complexity, we present in Figure 1 an institutions-based 
research framework for exploring lobbyists’ decisions to join coalitions.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
In response to concerns that extant EU lobbying research informed by institutional 
theory adopts a narrow view of institutional complexity, the framework proposes in line with 
Greenwood et al (2011) that the EU policymaking system in an institutional environment, 
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characterised by changing levels of institutional complexity. This leads to a situation whereby 
EU lobbyists are potentially confronted with competing institutional logics (e.g. Thornton, 
2004), each producing incentives that prescribe different types of coalition activity.  
Institutional incentives emanating from the Commission, whose purpose is to defend 
and promote European interests, may encourage lobbyists to ally in broad, pan-European 
coalitions that emphasise their European credentials. Inducement stemming from the 
European Parliament, whose members are responsible for considering the effects of 
Commission proposals on both the Single Market and national markets, possibly encourage 
lobbyists to join coalitions whose compositions reflect both national and European interests. 
The Council, charged with scrutinising legislation from a more national perspective, may emit 
incentives encouraging lobbyists to join forces in coalitions of single-nationality actors to 
appeal to their national heads of state and government.  
However, as per other scholars (e.g. Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mars & Lounsbury, 
2009; Reay & Hinings, 2009; Tracey et al, 2010), the framework also acknowledges that 
competing incentives arising from institutional complexity in Brussels do not affect all 
lobbyists equally. Instead, it proposes that institutional logics are filtered by various 
individual characteristics of lobbyists themselves (including, for example, their education 
backgrounds) and by attributes of the organisations that they represent (such as organisational 
type and ownership structure). Combined, these individual- and organisational-level attributes 
determine how lobbyists make sense out of institutional complexity in Brussels and influence 
their overall choices of preferred coalitions.   
3. Methods 
Our study was clearly informed by existing institutional theory, such that our data collection 
and analysis were designed to explore how lobbyists craft political-action responses to 
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competing institutional logics. Consequently, our research adopted an abductive (e.g. Meyer 
& Lunnay, 2012) as opposed to grounded theory (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990) approach. 
Abduction allows researchers to broaden existing knowledge as well as introduce new ideas 
(e.g. Habermas, 1978). It provides the flexibility associated with exploratory, inductive 
research by ensuring that individual’s perspectives predominate and that results are grounded 
in data. It has the added benefit of including theoretical frameworks within the analysis 
process whilst also considering unintended observations of empirical data which can remain 
opaque with a deductive approach (Meyer & Lunnay, 2012).  
3.1.3. Selection of informants and data collection 
We focus on lobbyists representing French and German organisations knowing that a large 
number of French and German business organisations lobby the EU and its institutions (e.g. 
Greenwood & Dreger, 2013). In addition, France and Germany – as members of both the 
Single Market and the Eurozone – are deeply embedded in the processes of European 
integration, meaning that lobbyists representing the interests of business organisations from 
the two countries are likely to be interested in following political debates across all three 
major institutions of the EU. We constructed our sample of informants using the European 
Transparency Register (an on-line database maintained by the European Commission to 
record the names and activities of lobbyists working in Brussels). In developing our sample, 
we wanted to ensure diversity amongst informants in terms of the types of organisations they 
represented, the industries in which they worked, and their backgrounds. Such diversity, we 
hoped, would allow for the expression of a variety of perceptions regarding institutional 
logics influencing lobbying in Brussels and how to respond to them.  
In total, we identified 114 potential interviewees and succeeded in creating a sample of 
26 who agreed to participate in our research. In common with previous research into EU 
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lobbying (eg, Barron & Hultén, 2014), our final sample is relatively small, but consistent with 
sample sizes that scholars recommend for exploratory research purposes (eg, Robson, 2011). 
Table 1 reports the key characteristics of the study participants. It consists of lobbyists whose 
perceptions and responses to institutional complexity in EU-level lobbying might vary in 
accordance with the type of organisation they work for, the industry sector in which they 
operate, their nationality, their educational backgrounds, their genders and their ages. We 
considered this sample appropriate for the exploratory purposes of our research.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
3.1.2. Interview guide  
Our interview guide consisted of three sets of broad questions. The first included general 
questions enabling informants to introduce themselves, to describe the organisation they 
represented, and to provide details on their career paths. These enabled us to capture 
important biographical information. The second set of questions encouraged informants to 
describe the different routes and venues that business organisations generally use to represent 
their political interests in Brussels. Our third set of questions invited interviewees to talk 
specifically about their own preferred routes and venues for i terest representation, and the 
reasons for those preferences. We carefully phrased our questions to ensure that informants’ 
testimonies were elicited in a non-directive manner, thereby encouraging informants to 
answer on their own terms and in their own words. This approach reflected the qualitative 
spirit of our research and the desire to avoid imposing pre-determined answers on information 
that could potentially influence the way in which they responded.   
3.1.3. Data analysis and interpretation 
Our interviews lasted approximately an hour, and were conducted during October and 
November 2013 either face-to-face in Brussels or by telephone depending on interviewees’ 
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availability. We recorded and transcribed each interview. The co-authors first interrogated the 
interview data to identify mentions of interviews’ personal perceptions about the institutional 
arrangements governing lobbying in the EU context, and second to highlight informants’ 
references to their strategic responses to those arrangements governing EU lobbying. We 
subsequently compared our findings, resolved discrepancies, and developed from our 
individual analyses a set of formally stated observations and quotes. The final steps of the 
analysis included sorting the information under the themes presented in Figure 1.  
4. Results 
4.1. Institutional complexity of EU lobbying 
Interviewees considered that, over time, lobbying in Brussels had become progressively more 
complex from an institutional perspective. Some interviewees (eg Interviews 7, 15) mentioned 
how complicated lobbying had become in an enlarged EU composed of 28 Member States. 
Others (eg Interview 12) alluded to divisions within the EU institutions making it difficult to 
skirt around growing tensions between the institutions. In the words of one lobbyist 
(Interview 1), her work involved “understanding the different institutions, and recognising for 
which different legal, economic and political aspects of the EU they were responsible.” 
Interviewees spoke about the practical challenges of this complexity. One (Interview 13) 
emphasised the time needed to train staff in the ever-changing intricacies of EU 
policymaking, which were increasingly difficult for both seasoned lobbyists and new hires to 
understand. Others (Interviews 1, 2, 15) described how difficult it had become to select the 
most appropriate route for accessing EU policymakers, highlighting the challenges associated 
with judging when best to contact policy officials alone, in business associations, or through 
ad hoc coalitions. As one informant (Interview 8) explained, it was difficult to work out which 
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of the EU institutions was the most appropriate to approach on the 60 dossiers he was 
currently managing.  
4.2. Coalition-building activity in response to competing institutional logics 
Interviews suggest that this increased complexity translates into two specific institutional 
logics. These, in turn, provide incentives for adopting two distinct approaches to building 
lobbying coalitions in Brussels. Interviews first exposed the existence of institutional 
incentives emanating from both the Commission and the Parliament. Interviewees explained 
that officials working f r these two institutions expected lobbyists to provide them with 
technical information on how markets operate and information about the aggregated needs 
and interests of particular interests in the EU internal market. In response to these 
expectations, lobbyists joined large, multi-lateral coalitions of experts that addressed 
relatively narrow policy issues.  
For example, one interviewee (Interview 2) explained that he, together with colleagues 
from 12 other firms, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and foundations, had created a 
pan-European alliance to provide Commission officials and MEPs with expertise to help 
achieve the EU’s environmental, economic and energy security goals. Another (Interview 12) 
described how he joined a coalition of 188 firms, research organisations and universities 
aimed at providing information on how to improve the performance and competitiveness of 
the European construction industry. Another still (Interview 25) explained how he had 
designed a coalition strategy, which involved allying with different partners to meet the 
specific information needs of heads of unit in the Commission and the members of Parliament 
committees.   
Interviews also revealed parallel incentives emerging from the Council, which are 
increasingly shaping lobbyists’ coalition actions in Brussels. These incentives encourage 
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lobbyists to create narrower alliances that address broader, higher-level policy issues. 
Interestingly, these narrower coalitions have a distinct bi-lateral composition. Both the French 
and German interviewees who admitted to creating such bilateral coalitions claimed that they 
specifically choose a business organisation from the other side of the Rhine as their preferred 
lobbying partner.  
The testimonies of two lobbyists – one French, and one German – illustrate the 
emergence of such bilateral coalitions explicitly (Interviews 21 and 25). They explained that 
officials in the Council and their respective Permanent Representations sought bi-lateral, 
Franco-German positions in preparation for policy debates with other national leaders during 
Council meetings. Thus, the two organisations were incentivised to adopt a joint 
communication strategy, which involved issuing common press releases stressing the impact 
of the broad, high-profile policy issues under discussion at the Council meeting (eg 
employment and growth, innovation, competitiveness, the future of the Eurozone) on the 
national economies of France and Germany.  
4.3. Variations in lobbyists’ receptivity to institutional logics 
Importantly, our interviews reveal differences in lobbyists’ receptivity to the two institutional 
logics, and consequently variations in their choices of coalitions. All interviewees recognised 
the existence of the specific institutional incentives emanating from the Commission and the 
Parliament. They also admitted that – either at present or in the past – these incentives had 
exerted an influence on their preferred form of lobbying coalition. By contrast, only relatively 
few of our interviewees (Interviews 7, 10, 20, 21, 25 and 26) also acknowledged institutional 
incentives emerging from the Council. Nonetheless, these specific interviewees admitted that 
Council-level incentives were increasingly shaping their coalition actions in Brussels. As 
reported below, the semi-structured nature of our interviewees enabled us to identify a 
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number of organisational- and individual-level factors that explain differences in lobbyists’ 
receptivity to the two competing institutional logics. 
4.2.1 Organisational-level factors influencing receptivity to institutional logics 
All interviewees representing national-level, industry associations claimed to respond 
principally to incentives from the Commission and the Parliament to join broad, multi-lateral 
coalitions (Interviews 1, 17, 19, 22, 24). For example:  
“We work with all business associations representing our industry in Europe. 
We certainly have no favouritism for one particular nationality or country.” 
(Interview 1) 
None admitted to allying in narrower coalitions in response to Council-level incentives to 
conduct more bilateral lobbying actions. The raison d’être of national industry associations, 
stressed two informants (Interviews 1 and 17), was after all to cooperate with European 
associations and formulate unified, European positions expected by the Commission and the 
Parliament. Lobbyists representing individual firms were, on the whole, also more receptive 
to Commission- and Parliament-level incentives than to Council-level incentives. Some 
lobbyists (Interviews 4, 9, 11, 12, 13) even expressed explicit concerns about being denied 
access to who they considered the most influential policymakers if they formed narrow 
coalitions with other firms from another, specific Member State. For example:  
“It’s extremely risky, from both a commercial and a political perspective, to 
have a bilateral co-operation with one company from one country only.  It’s 
important to ensure that the group represents various member states, bigger and 
smaller companies, different industries.” (Interview 4) 
As another informant explained:  
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“You’re dead if you approach the Commission and the Parliament with narrow 
Member State interests” (Interview 8).  
Ownership structures emerged as a possible reason explaining why some lobbyists 
representing individual firms were sensitive to Council-level incentives and joined bilateral 
coalitions. Two of our informants (Interviews 20 and 26), representing state-owned banking 
organisations, suggested that their government shareholders were encouraging them to work 
bilaterally to formulate and communication common positions on EU policy:  
“We ally with [ ur German counterpart] because we are both state-owned. Our 
respective national governments are interested in learning about good banking 
practice in our two countries.” (Interview 20) 
“Government officials in Berlin encourage me to organise bilateral workshops 
specifically with [a French counterpart] to learn about the French market and 
how French policymakers are addressing particular challenges. Those workshops 
obviously lead to common positions.” (Interview 26) 
Our interviews also suggest that lobbyists’ receptivity to Council-level incentives is positively 
influenced by bilateral cross-shareholdings. For example, one French interviewee claimed to 
communicate strictly bilateral policy positions specifically because his company had 
primarily French and German shareholders:  
“Our firm is basically Franco-German in ownership, so our lobbying work is 
completely bilateral, aimed principally at influencing simultaneously the French 
President and the German Chancellor in the Council.” (Interview 7) 
Another French informant (Interview 10) revealed that, although her company has been 
historically reluctant to represent bilateral interests with other firms, her attitude had changed 
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following a one-off sharing of equity capital with a German competitor. This mutual 
investment, she explained, was leading to a closer political alliance, based on more frequent 
dialogue, more sharing of information, and the representation of more common, bilateral 
policy positions.  
4.2.2 Individual-level factors influencing receptivity to institutional logics 
Our data suggest cross-national differences in lobbyists’ receptivity to institutional logics. 
From a purely quantitative perspective, we observe no striking variations in the extent to 
which our German and French interviewees were responsive to incentives to join broad, 
European coalitions and target their collective actions at the Commission and Parliament. 
However, four of the six lobbyists who admitted to creating bilateral coalitions whose actions 
were aimed primarily at the Council were French (Interviews 7, 10, 20 and 21). Amongst 
these, we detected a common perception of strong, macro-level economic interdependence 
between France and Germany. As summarised by one informant (Interview 20):  
“France and Germany are each other’s main supplier and purchaser of imports 
and exports, and amongst the main sources and destinations of each other’s 
foreign direct investment. These cross-border dependency relations – based on 
trade and investment – require close, bilateral lobbying of the French President 
and German Chancellor in the Council.” 
None of our German interviewees alluded to these close trade and investment dependencies 
between Germany and France. In the words of one informant (Interview 4):  
“Maybe there were closer ties between France and Germany in the past, but it’s 
certainly not the case today.”  
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More significant than nationality in determining receptivity to institutional logics was the age 
of our interviewees. Crucially, the younger lobbyists in our sample admitted to be being more 
sensitive to inducements to join broad, pan-European coalitions. This, explained one French 
informant (Interview 2), was because they saw themselves first and foremost as Europeans 
who were  
“not strongly influenced by their national cultures, but [who had] deliberately 
attempted to distance themselves from the corporate and political worlds of their 
home nations.”  
This and other younger lobbyists (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 9, 11 and 18) described themselves as 
working in a ‘Brussels bubble’ of policymaking. Within that bubble, claimed one interviewee 
(Interview 5), younger lobbyists had decoupled themselves from political discourses in their 
home countries and developed a shared European understanding of political problems and 
their solutions. 
We observed that informants most receptive to multilateral lobbying coalitions at the 
Commission- and Parliament-level were also graduates of European Studies and European 
Law degree programmes (eg, interviews 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9). These informants admitted that their 
educational backgrounds had sensitised them to Commission- and Parliament-level logics to 
engage in broad, multilateral coalitions. For example:  
“My study year [in France] was a very European experience. It taught me the 
value of not analysing issues from a national perspective” (Interview 1) 
“My Masters in European Law at LSE made me passionate about the European 
project and the need to defend European interests” (Interview 2) 
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 “I studied in Dresden and Amsterdam, so I’ve a fair amount of European 
exposure, which is important for this job. I see colleagues who have very little 
European experience and tend to work along more national lines” (Interview 9) 
Conversely, those lobbyists more incentivised to enter into narrower, bilateral coalitions and 
target their political actions at the Council level were graduates of primarily engineering-
focused disciplines. We observed in particular that French proponents of bilateral coalitions 
had attended a grande école – one of France’s elitist and selective higher education 
establishments that exist outside the main framework of the French university system. 
Commenting on our observations regarding educational backgrounds, two informants 
suggested that there exists a “new school” of policymakers and lobbyists in Brussels who 
have been academically and professionally trained to think and act along European as 
opposed to national or bilateral lines:  
 “There’s an ‘old-school’ take on lobbying, based on wining and dining and 
networking with national policymakers. My younger colleagues and I take a 
much more ‘new-school’, regulatory affairs perspective. We focus specifically 
on analysing content of Commission proposals, and try to identify opportunities 
and threats for our firms.” (Interview 4) 
“You certainly find elite-trained Brussels lobbyists who act like ‘little princes’ 
around national-level policymakers in the Council.” (Interview 9) 
5. Findings and discussion  
Prior research suggests that interest groups join coalitions for resource-efficiency reasons (eg, 
Hula, 1999), as a result of cost-benefit analyses (eg, Hojnacki, 1997), or as part of a 
bargaining process where two conflicting groups choose to work together towards a new 
policy positions that satisfies them both (eg, Nelson and Webb Yackee, 2012). Distinguishing 
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itself from this extant work, our own research highlights how lobbyists’ decisions to join 
interest group coalitions can be informed by institutional incentives. Of course, other scholars 
have already investigated institutional factors and their effects on decisions to join coalitions 
(eg, Gray and Lowery, 1998; Coen, 2004; Mahoney, 2007) However, our own study builds on 
these institutionally-informed studies in two particular ways.  
First, it draws attention to the dynamic and complex character of institutional 
configurations governing lobbying activities. We specifically found in the EU context that 
lobbyists face two competing institutional logics – one logic providing incentives to join 
forces with other European organisations, develop multilateral policy messages, and 
communicate those messages to the Commission and the Parliament; and another, emergent 
logic providing inducements to form narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, 
and direct those messages at the Council. The recent emergence of incentives encouraging 
bilateral forms of coalitions is in our view a significant finding. It adds to extant research (eg, 
Bouwen, 2002; Eising, 2007; Mazey and Richardson, 2006; Woll, 2006) suggesting either 
implicitly or explicitly that coalition activity in Brussels is primarily multilateral in character, 
as lobbyists seek to acquire European credentials in broad groups and mobilize European 
credibility to access key policymakers, especially in the Commission. It also focuses attention 
on the Council as an increasingly important policymaking arena whilst the lion’s share of EU-
level lobbying focuses attention on the Commission (eg, Bunea and Baumgartner, 2014). 
The rise of bilateral lobbying coalitions targeting the Council makes sense given 
recent institutional changes in the EU. As argued by Puetter (2012), we are witnessing an era 
of resurgent intergovernmentalism as the Member States increasingly take possession of pre-
eminent decision-making power, and the Council moves towards the centre of political 
gravity. As Webber (1999) explains, decisions taken at the Council level commonly reflect 
‘bargains’ struck between two governments who join forces bilaterally and apply pressure on 
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other Member States  to participate in integration projects they support. This changing 
institutional context appears to be incentivising lobbyists to join forces bilaterally and help 
their national policymakers strike bargains with representatives of other Member States.  
We acknowledge that bilateral coalitions that target the Council are – currently at least 
– less common than multi-lateral coalitions targeting the Commission and the Parliament. 
This finding, we suggest, could feasibly be explained by rising intergovernmentalism being a 
relatively recent institutional trend in Brussels (eg, Puetter, 2012). Indeed, the lobbying 
behaviours of business organisations might still be largely shaped by the more historically 
entrenched, multi-level institutional configurations placing the Commission at the heart of EU 
policymaking. Many of our informants might be continuing to target their lobbying activities 
primarily at the Commission and Parliament because their professional experiences and 
background prevent them from recognising a new institutional opportunity for lobbying.    
Our research also adds to institutionally-informed studies into interest coalitions by 
highlighting how lobbyists’ receptivity to institutional incentives – and in turn their choices of 
preferred coalitions and coalition partners – vary in accordance with organisational-level and 
individual-level attributes. In terms of organisational-level attributes, we found that lobbyists 
representing national-level trade associations and – for the most part – individual firms were 
most sensitive to incentives emanating from the Commission and the Parliament to 
communicate multilateral policy messages with a large number of other European 
organisations. Our finding that these broad, multi-lateral coalitions lobby policymakers on 
highly specific issues is at odds with prior research (eg, Mahoney, 2007) suggesting that 
organisations create broad coalitions around salient, highly mediatized issues as such types of 
issues especially demand advocates to demonstrate a broad basis of support. Our interview 
data suggest that trade associations and firms form coalitions in Brussels even when there is 
little or no widespread news coverage of a particular issue. Our finding that especially 
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individual firms join large, multi-lateral coalitions to address relatively specific policy 
questions is also significant: it contradicts existing research (eg, Gray and Lowery, 1998) 
indicating that organisations are most likely to join broad coalitions if lobbying forms a key 
component of their work.  
We found examples of firms whose lobbyists were more sensitive to Council-level 
incentives, and thus chose to lobby in bilateral coalitions. These lobbyists identified 
ownership structures as a key reason explaining their sensitivity to these particular incentives. 
This finding generally confirms prior institutions-based research suggesting that the 
composition of ownership shapes the relative responsiveness to institutional logics (eg, Chung 
and Luo, 2008: Miller et al, 2010: Walsh et al, 2003). We specifically found that lobbyists 
representing publicly-owned firms were the most receptive to Council-level incentives to 
form narrow, bilateral coalitions. This chimes with prior studies (eg, Goodrick and Salancik, 
1996: Lounsburg, 2001) illustrating how differences in the public versus private ownership of 
organisations influence responsiveness to institutional logics. As per these authors, the 
publicly-owned organisations in our sample might implicitly yet diplomatically be aligning 
their strategic responses to institutional cues to the preferences of the (national) governments 
upon which they are financially dependent.  
Bilateral cross-shareholdings, we found, appear to heighten receptivity to Council-
level incentives to form bilateral coalitions. This makes sense insofar as such inter-linkages 
create close, cross-country connections between organisations. These ties might feasibly make 
firms more dependent on economic and political developments in two specific countries. By 
extension, their lobbyists may become particularly sensitive to institutional incentives to 
engage in bilateral rather than multilateral lobbying. This finding reiterates previous studies 
(eg, Burris, 2005) illustrating how the ties formed through inter-firm linkages contribute more 
than similarities in economic interests to patterns of political behaviour.  
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We also found that lobbyists representing employers’ associations (compared to those 
representing firms and industry-specific business associations) were more sensitive to Council 
incentives to join narrow, bilateral coalitions. This finding can potentially be explained by 
prior research (eg, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991) suggesting that perceptions of 
and responses to institutional logics can be shaped by other actors exogenous to organisations 
who exert compliance pressures on organisations and managers through resource-dependence 
relationships. Crucially, employers’ associations in France and Germany are ‘social partner’, 
non-profit organisations that are partially reliant on government funding to provide services 
demanded by their respective national governments, especially with respect to the 
management of national social security systems . Because French and German employers’ 
associations are essentially organisations resembling public agencies that depend on national 
governments for financial resources, it is probable that their political representatives will seek 
to comply with the demands of their national government stakeholders to avoid anxieties 
linked to funding uncertainty (eg, Kramer and Grossman, 1987). 
It is noteworthy that French lobbyists choosing to join bilateral coalitions should opt to 
partner specifically with German lobbyists, and vice versa. This finding could be explained by 
the pivotal role of Franco-German relationships in the process of European integration (eg, 
Trouille and Uterwedde, 2013). Crucially, Krotz and Schild (2013) highlight how a special 
relationship between Paris and Berlin is supported by dense networks of experts and civil 
servants who facilitate frequent consultations among political leaders and promote consensus 
on policy issues. Our findings tentatively suggest that this system of ‘embedded bilateralism’ 
(ibid: 11) underpinning the Franco-German relationship may be extending beyond the purely 
political arena to the broader sphere of business-interest representation. Thus, when seeking 
common positions on EU-level policy in the Council, French and German policymakers are 
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potentially also increasingly supported by employers’ associations and publicly-owned firms 
who provide bilateral information needed to craft joint Franco-German policy positions.  
Our research also exposes how the backgrounds of individual lobbyists can influence 
how they are receptive and responsive to the competing institutional incentives they face in 
Brussels. These findings are significant insofar as research into lobbying in general, and EU 
lobbying in particular, tends to take individual firms (eg, Barron and Hulten, 2014), national-
level business associations (eg, Wilts and Quitkatt, 2004), European associations (eg, 
Greenwood, 2002) as they primarily unit of analysis. By focusing on the individual lobbyist, 
our own research exposes some of the deeper, more human dimensions of EU lobbying.   
Essentially, we found that receptivity to Commission/Parliament-level incentives to 
join broad, pan-European coalitions was strongest amongst younger lobbyists with academic 
and professional qualifications in European Studies and European Law and who perceive 
themselves first and foremost as European rather than French or German. This finding reflects 
the spirit of emergent research exploring the role played by individual identity as a filter for 
interpreting and responding to institutional cues (eg, Glynn, 2008; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). 
It is also in keeping with existing institutions-based research suggesting that individuals are 
committed to certain institutional logics, and that those commitments play an important role 
in terms of influencing the strategies they mobilise in the face of institutional incentives and 
pressures (eg, Battilana and Dorado, 2010; Mars and Lounsbury, 2009; Reay et al., 2009; 
Tracey et al., 2010). This finding especially reflects Scott’s idea that individuals can be 
considered in terms of carriers of institutionalised templates (Scott, 1995) into which they 
have been socialised through formal education or professional experience (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983).  
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Our finding that younger graduates of in particular European Studies and European 
Law are more responsive to Commission-level incentives to engage in broad multi-level 
lobbying along European lines makes sense in light of the recent efforts to create a European 
Higher Education Area (EHEA), in which European universities are encouraged, with a view 
to promoting staff and student mobility, to provide common study and degree programmes 
that  increasingly emphasise the broad European context whilst downplaying national interests 
(eg, Antunes, 2006). That graduates from prestigious educational establishments are more 
sensitive to the Council’s more intergovernmental incentives appears reasonable given that 
leading universities are commonly used by governments to mould national power elites. This 
is especially the case in France, where the grandes écoles have historically imparted a strong, 
homogenous bureaucratic training focused on the national French interest (eg, Maclean et al  
2014). 
6. Conclusions 
Using data gathered from in-depth interviews with lobbyists representing firms, industry 
associations and employers’ associations, we investigated why business interests join 
lobbying coalitions in Brussels. We found that, EU lobbyists’ are confronted with incentives 
to ally with other European organisations, develop multilateral policy messages, and 
communicate those messages to the Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they 
face inducements to join narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages, and direct 
those messages at the Council. Lobbyists’ receptivity to these incentives – and in turn their 
preferred choices of lobbying coalitions – differ according to their, age, educational 
background and the type and ownership structure of the organisations they represent.  
These findings build on emerging institutions-based accounts of why lobbyists choose 
to join coalitions. Contrary to this prior research, our own study actively engages with the 
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concept of institutional complexity to illustrate that lobbyists face competing institutional 
pressures and that their interpretations and reactions to those pressures are shaped by their 
own personal biographies and the characteristics of the organisations they represent. 
 In addition to these theoretical contributions, our research also has practical 
implications for policymakers across the EU institutions. As mentioned above, successive 
treaty changes – coupled with economic and financial developments in the Eurozone – have 
altered the balance of power in Brussels, especially between the Commission and the Council 
(eg, Puetter, 2011). As the Council has gained more decision-making powers as a result of 
treaty changes and the crisis in the Eurozone, there has opened up another potential level of 
lobbying activity with an additional opportunity to shape policy at a more advanced stage of 
the policy cycle. Accordingly, if European-minded civil servants in the Commission know 
that certain lobbyists – given their age, educational backgrounds and company affiliations – 
could be more responsive to European concerns, they will able to identify sympathetic 
corporate allies upon whose specialist knowledge they depend when drafting their technical 
proposals. The same knowledge will enable more bilaterally-orientated policymakers in the 
Council to anticipate and respond to business opponents to their specific interests.   
We openly acknowledge that the qualitative, explorative focus of our study means that 
our findings need to be handled with caution. Our research is based on 26 interviews with 
French and German lobbyists. This reflects of course the size of two of the largest economies 
in the EU. However, we cannot assume that our findings are generalizable to all lobbyists 
working in Brussels, or in other institutional contexts. Our findings may also be influenced by 
the fact that Franco-German relations represent the most prominent bilateral relationship in 
the EU (eg, Webber, 1999). We thus advise that our key findings ultimately be considered in 
terms of intermediate hypotheses whose broader validity requires further, rigorous empirical 
testing. Given the growing interest in the influence of lobbying coalitions (eg, Klüver, 2013), 
Page 27 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
future studies could also compare the effectiveness of broad, multilateral versus narrower, 
bilateral coalitions in shaping policy outcomes. In this respect, it is necessary and important to 
investigate whether and how officials involved in the determination of EU-level policy 
ultimately respond and react to policy preferences articulated by different types of coalitions.  
Despite these limitations and the need for further empirical work, our research 
nonetheless demonstrates that, as lobbyists’ interpretations of institutional complexity can be 
heterogeneous, so can be their strategic responses to that complexity. Thus, we hope that our 
study will motivate scholars to embrace the notion that lobbyists are ultimately individuals 
who draw on their personal backgrounds and experience when making sense of and 
responding to the inherently complex institutional environments within which they operate.   
Appendix 
Figure 1 An institutions-based framework for exploring the coalition activity of lobbyists in 
Brussels 
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Table 1 Description of sample 
Interview Age Education Nationality Organisation Sector 
1 43 European Law German Association Insurance 
2 38 European Law French Firm Electronics 
3 37 Management German Firm Energy 
4 39 European Studies German Firm Automotive 
5 34 European Studies German Firm Electronics 
6 44 European Studies German Firm Logistics 
7 47 Engineering French Firm Aerospace/defence 
8 51 Engineering French Firm Aerospace/defence 
9 31 European Studies German Firm Technical inspection 
10 48 European Law French Firm Automotive 
11 26 European Studies French Firm Automotive 
12 42 Bio-Science French Firm Construction 
13 68 Management French Firm Aerospace/defence 
14 37 Engineering German Association Industry-spanning 
15 41 European Studies French Firm Energy 
16 46 Management German Firm Logistics 
17 49 Management French Association Fashion/textiles 
18 45 Engineering French Firm Electronics 
19 58 Law German Association Agriculture 
20 39 Engineering French Firm Banking 
21 46 Law French Association Industry-spanning 
22 57 Economics French Association Automotive 
23 32 Management French Firm Logistics 
24 53 Economics German Association Aerospace/defence 
25 39 Engineering German Association Industry-spanning 
26 38 Economics German Firm Banking 
 
References 
Antunes F, 2006, “Globalisation and Europeification of education Policies: routes, processes 
and metamorphoses” European Educational Research Journal 5 38-56 
Barron A, Hulten P, 2014, “Exploring corporate lobbyists’ perceptions of prospective 
coalition partners in Brussels” Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 32 963-
981 
Battilana J, Dorado S, 2010, “Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of 
commercial microfinance organizations” Academy of Management Journal 53 1419–1440. 
Baumgartner F R, Berry J M, Hojnacki M, Kimball D C, Leech B, 2009, Lobbying and policy 
change – who wins, who loses and why (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) 
Berry J M, 1989 The Interest Group Society 2nd edition (Scott, Foresman and Company, 
Glenview, IL) 
Blumentritt T P, 2003, “Foreign subsidiaries’ government affairs activities—The influences 
of managers and resources” Business & Society 42 202–233  
Page 29 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Bouwen P, 2002, “Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access” Journal of 
European Public Policy 9 365–90 
Broscheid A, Coen D, 2003, “Insider and outsider lobbying of the European Commission: an 
informational model of forum politics” European Union Politics 4 165-191 
Bunea A, Baumgarter F R, 2014, “The state of the discipline: authorship, research designs, 
and citation patterns in studies of EU interest groups and lobbying” Journal of European 
Public Policy 21 1412-1434 
Burris V, 1995, “Interlocking directorates and political cohesion among corporate elites. 
American Journal of Sociology 111 249-283 
Chung C, Luo X, 2008, “Institutional logics or agency costs: The influence of corporate 
governance models on business group restructuring in emerging economies” Organization 
Science 19 766–784 
Coen D, 1997, “The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European Union” 
Journal of European Public Policy 4 91–108 
Coen D, 2004, “Environmental and business lobbying alliances in Europe: learning from 
Washington?”, in Business in International Environmental Governance: A Political Economy 
Approach Eds D Levy and P Newell (MIT Press, Cambridge MA) pp 147–166 
Coen D, 2007, “Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying” Journal of European 
Public Policy 14 333-345 
D’Aunno T, Sutton R, Price R, 1991, “Isomorphism and external support in conflicting 
institutional environments: A study of drug abuse treatment units” Academy of Management 
Journal 14 636–661 
DiMaggio P J, Powell W W, 1983, “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields” American Sociological Review 48 147–160. 
Eising R, 2007, “The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards élite pluralism?” 
Journal of European Public Policy 14 384-403 
Elsbach K, Sutton R, 1992, “Acquiring organizational legitimacy through illegitimate actions: 
A marriage of institutional and impression management theories” Academy of Management 
Journal 35 699–738 
Glynn M A, 2008, “Beyond constraint: How institutions enable identities” in The SAGE 
handbook of organizational institutionalism Eds R Greenwood, C Oliver, K Sahlin, R 
Suddaby (Sage Publications, London) pp 413–430 
Goodrick  E, Salancik G R, 1996,  “Organizational discretion in responding to institutional 
practices: Hospitals and caesarean births” Administrative Science Quarterly 41 1–28. 
Gray V, Lowery D, 1998, “To lobby alone or in a flock – foraging behavior amongst 
organized interests” American Politics Quarterly 26 5-34 
Greenwood J, 2002, Inside the EU business associations (Palgrave, Houndsmills) 
Greenwood J, Dreger J, 2013, “The Transparency Register – A European vanguard for strong 
lobby regulation” Interest Groups & Advocacy 2 139-162.  
Page 30 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Greenwood J, Aspinwall M, 1998, Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the 
New Politics of Associability (Routledge, London/New York) 
Greenwood, R., Raynard, M., Kodeih, F., Micelotta, E R, Lounsbury, M. (2011) Institutional 
complexity and organisational responses. The Academy of Management Annals, 5, 317–371 
Habermas J, 1978, Knowledge and Human Interests (Heinemann Educational, London) 
Heaney MT, 2004, “Issue Networks, Information, and Interest Group Alliances: The Case of 
Wisconsin Welfare Politics, 1993–99” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 4 237-270 
Hillman A, Hitt M A, 1999, “Corporate political strategy formulation—A model of approach, 
participation and strategy decisions” Academy of Management Review 24 825–842 
Hillman A, Keim G, 1995, “International variation in the business-government interface—
Institutional and organizational considerations” Academy of Management Review 20 193–214 
Hojnacki M, 1998, “Organized Interests’ Advocacy Behavior in Alliance” Political Research 
Quarterly 51 437–459  
Hojnacki M, 1997, “Interest groups’ decisions to join alliances or work alone” American 
Journal of Political Science 41 61-87 
Hula K W, 1999 Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics 
(Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC) 
Hula K, 1995, “Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Forging Interest Group Coalitions in 
Washington” in Interest Group Politics Eds A J Cigler,  B A Loomis (Quarterly Press, 
Washington, DC) pp 239-258 
Kraatz M S, Block E S, 2008, “Organizational implications of institutional pluralism”, in The 
SAGE handbook of organizational institutionalism Eds R Greenwood, C Oliver, K Sahlin, R 
Suddaby (Sage Publications, London) pp 243–275 
Kramer R M, Grossman B, 1987, “Contracting for social services – process management and 
resource dependencies” Social Science Review 61 32-55  
Krotz U, Schild, J, 2013, Shaping Europe – France, Germany and Embedded Bilateralism 
from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Klüver H, 2013, Lobbying in the European Union – interest groups, lobbying coalitions and 
policy change (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Lawton T, McGuire S, Rajwani T, 2013, “Corporate political activity: A literature review and 
research agenda” International Journal of Management Reviews 15 86–105 
Loomis B A, 1986, “Coalitions of Interest: Building Bridges in the Balkanized State” in 
Interest Group Politics Eds A J Cigler, B A Loomis (Quarterly Press, Washington, DC) 258-
274 
Lounsbury M, 2001, “Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college and 
university recycling programs” Administrative Science Quarterly 46 29–56 
Maclean M, Harvey C, Kling G, 2014, “Pathways to power – class, hyper-agency and the 
French corporate elite” Organization Studies doi:10.1177/0170840613509919 
Page 31 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Mahoney C, 2007, “Networking vs. Allying: The Decision of Interest Groups to Join 
Coalitions in the US and the EU” Journal of European Public Policy 14 366-383 
Mars M M, Lounsbury M, 2009, “Raging Against or With the Private Marketplace? Logic 
hybridity and eco-entrepreneurship” Journal of Management Inquiry 1 4-13  
Mazey S, Richardson J, 2006, “Interest groups and EU policy-making: organizational logic 
and venue shopping”, in European Union: Power and Policy-Making Ed J Richardson 
(Routledge, London/New York) pp 247-265 
Meyer J W, Rowan B, 1977, Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony American Journal of Sociology 83 440–463 
Meyer R E, Hollerer M A, 2010, “Meaning structures in a contested issue field: A 
topographic map of shareholder value in Austria” Academy of Management Journal 53 1241–
1262 
Meyer S B, Lunnay B, 2012 The Application of Abductive and Retroductive Inference for the 
Design and Analysis of Theory-Driven Sociological Research. Sociological Research Online, 
18, 12 
Miller D, Le Breton-Miller I, Lester R, 2010, “Family and lone founder ownership and 
strategic behavior: Social context, identity, and institutional logics” Journal of Management 
Studies 48 1–25. 
Nelson D, Webb Yackee, S, 2012, “Lobbying Coalitions and Government Policy Change: An 
Analysis of Federal Agency Rulemaking” The Journal of Politics, 74, 339-353 
North D C, 1990, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge)  
Nugent N, 2010, The government and politics of the European Union – 7
th
 edition (Palgrave 
Macmillan, Basingstoke)  
Oliver C, 1991, “Strategic responses to institutional processes” Academy of Management 
Review 16 145–179 
Pache A, Santos F, 2010, “When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational 
responses to conflicting institutional demands” Academy of Management Review 35 455–476 
Pfeffer J, Salancik G, 1978, The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective (Harper & Row, New York/London) 
Pijnenburg B, 1998, “EU lobbying by ad hoc coalitions: an exploratory case study” Journal of 
European Public Policy 14 95–145 
Puetter U, 2012, “Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism – the role of the Council and 
European Council in EU economic governance” Journal of European Public Policy 19 161-
178  
Reay T, Hinings C R, 2009, “Managing the rivalry of competing institutional logics” 
Organization Studies 30 629–652 
Robson C, 2011, Real world research – a resource for users of social research methods in 
applied settings (Wiley, Chichester) 
Page 32 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Scott W R, 1995, Institutions and organizations (Sage Publications, London)  
Scott W R, 1991, “Unpacking institutional arguments” in The new institutionalism in 
organizational analysis Eds. W W Powell, P J DiMaggio (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago) pp 164–182 
Strauss A, Corbin J, 1990, Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures and 
Techniques (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks) 
Taminiau Y, Wilts A, 2006, “Corporate lobbying in Europe, managing knowledge and 
information strategies” Journal of Public Affairs 6 122-130. 
Thornton P H, Ocasio W, Lounsbury M, 2012, The institutional logics perspective: A new 
approach to culture, structure, and process. (Oxford University Press, Oxford) 
Thornton P H, 2004, Markets from culture: Institutional logics and organizational decisions 
in higher education publishing (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA) 
Tracey P, Phillips N, Jarvis O, 2011, “Bridging institutional entrepreneurship and the creation 
of new organizational forms: A multilevel model” Organization Science 22 60–80. 
Trouille J-M, Uterwedde H, 2013, “Frankreich, Deutschland und die europäische 
Wirtschaftspolitik: Kooperation mit Hindernissen” in Frankreich Jahrbuch, Deutsch-
französische Beziehungen: Entwicklungslinien und Funktionswandel Ed S. Seidendorf 
(Springer Verlag, Berlin) pp 127-144 
Walsh J P, Weber K, Margolis J D, 2003, “Social issues and management: Our lost cause 
found” Journal of Management 29 859–881 
Webber D, 1999, The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union (Routledge, 
London)  
Whitford A B, 2003, “The Structures of Interest Coalitions: Evidence from Environmental 
Litigation” Business and Politics 5 45–64. 
Wilts A, Quittkat C, 2004, Corporate interests and public affairs – organised business-
government relations in EU member states Journal of Public Affairs 4 384-399 
Woll C, 2006, “Lobbying in the European Union: From sui generis to a comparative 
perspective” Journal of European Public Policy 13 456–469 
 
Page 33 of 33
https://mc04.manuscriptcentral.com/epc-pion
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
